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TO THE READER
This paper raises a provocative question: Does the increase in  
college enrollment over the past 30 years partly reflect the 
changing pressures on employers based on a 1971 court case? And 
if so, could these pressures also explain the much-touted increase 
in earnings that comes from a college education? 
“Griggs vs. Duke Power: Implications for College Credentialing,” by 
Bryan O’Keefe and Richard Vedder, is jointly published by the 
Pope Center for Higher Education Policy and the Center for 
College Affordability and Productivity. The Center for Excellence 
in Higher Education (CEHE) provided financial support, and we 
appreciate the insights of an anonymous reviewer.
Bryan O’Keefe was associate director of the Center for College 
Affordability and Productivity until this summer. Previously, he 
was a researcher at the American Enterprise Institute, studying 
domestic politics, public opinion polling, and labor issues. His 
writing on labor issues has appeared in publications such as the  
New York Post, the Philadelphia Inquirer, the New York Sun, Labor  
Watch, Doublethink, and Tech Central Station. O’Keefe also 
worked as a labor consultant in the labor relations practice of 
Burton-Marsteller. O’Keefe, who graduated from George Washington  
University, is attending law school.
 
Richard Vedder is Distinguished Professor of Economics at Ohio  
University, a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute,  
and founding director of the Center for College Affordability 
and Productivity.  A prominent voice in current movements for 
reform of higher education, Vedder served on the Secretary of 
Education’s Commission on the Future of Higher Education and 
is the author of Going Broke By Degree: Why College Costs Too 
Much. In addition to writing on higher education, Vedder has 
explored many economic topics; he is co-author with Wendell Cox  
of The Wal-Mart Revolution: How Big Box Stores Benefit Consumers,  
Workers, and the Economy.
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his paper is about a court case decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in  
1971. Although attorneys recognize that the case is important to 
businesses, its impact on colleges and universities has been explored by  
only a few.  As this paper will show, Griggs v. Duke Power may have 
enormously boosted the number of students in college and may have increased 
the differential in income between high school and college graduates.  It may 
have led to higher tuition, without providing commensurate additional value. 
Indeed, it could even be a judicial decision whose economic implications have 
been matched by only a few far more celebrated cases in history such as  Gibbons 
v. Ogden (1824), the Dred Scott decision (1857), and the Schechter Poultry 
case (1935). The hypothesis of this paper is that Griggs turned a college degree 
into a “credential.” The content of the education did not change, but the 
degree—the sheepskin—became a necessary first step for a decent job. 
 
Today, for many jobs, only a degree opens the doors of potential employers’ 
offices. It does not ensure a job—college graduates often say that it is just a 
“fishing license”—but it assures the employer that an applicant has at least 
a minimum level of skill and accomplishment. In the eyes of an employer, a 
degree demonstrates that the applicant passed a certain number of classes, 
completed outside reading, wrote at least a couple of papers, thought critically, 
and was able to manage his or her life in a way that led to graduation. Such 
skills—determination, critical thinking and writing, organization, and 
independence—are often valued by employers. 
Providing such assurance to employers did not always require a college degree, 
and this credentialing function did not happen by chance. Through a series 
of court rulings and subsequent legislation, a cumbersome set of legal rules has 
developed that make it difficult for employers to use testing to find out if an 
applicant is intelligent, capable, and diligent. As we will see, fear of litigation 
is always in the background. For many jobs, a college degree has become an 
alternate means of “testing.”
Griggs v. Duke Power:
Implications for
College Credentialing 
By Bryan O’Keefe and Richard Vedder
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This paper will describe Griggs, the environment from which it emerged, and 
the subsequent judicial and political activity that created such great constraints 
on testing. It will discuss testing today and then provide economic information 
suggesting the magnitude of the changes that Griggs may have instigated. While 
this paper does not “prove” the educational and economic consequences of 
Griggs, it suggests that additional scholarly work on the impact of Griggs on 
higher education is appropriate.
Employment Testing and the 1964 Civil Rights Act
o understand the importance of Griggs, we need to go back to the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, and, in particular, Title VII, which dealt with 
employment issues. The nation was attempting to address decades of 
racial discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act was seen as a major 
vehicle for correcting the wrongs of the past. The most important section of this 
law in relationship to employers was 703(a)(1), and 703 (a)(2), which spelled 
out constraints on their actions. 
These sections read:
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer –
     (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or
     (2) to limit, segregate, or classify 
his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would  
deprive or tend to deprive any  
individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.”1  
At the time of the law’s passage, employers routinely tested prospective 
employees, leading at least one researcher to conclude that “it is probably safe 
to say that there are more ability tests given annually in the United States than 
there are people.”2  One survey in 1963 found that 84 percent of employers 
were using some type of personnel test, up from 64 percent in 1958.3  Another 
study found that 2,171 such tests were printed in the year 1964 alone.4  This 
T
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does not even take into account the civil service testing system, which the 
government had widely used since the 1870s.  
The civil rights community was concerned that some employee testing was 
being done to intentionally exclude minority job candidates. The business 
community defended employer testing and claimed that it was fundamental to 
ensuring a qualified workforce.  
These arguments made their way into 
the debate over the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act and, in particular, the sections of 
the proposed legislation cited above. 
From the start of the debate, Senator 
John Tower of Texas objected that 
the proposed legislation could unfairly 
limit an employer’s right to test 
employees. In floor debate, Senator 
Tower buttressed his point by citing 
the specific and recent example of a 
state hearing officer in Illinois who 
had ruled that a standard ability test that the Motorola corporation had used for 
years was illegal because the test was unfair to “disadvantaged groups.”5  
Supporters of the legislation strongly discounted these concerns. Senators 
Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and Clifford Case of New Jersey criticized 
Tower’s example, with Humphrey saying that it was an isolated case. Case 
labeled it a “red herring” and said that the proposed civil rights legislation was 
“completely different” from the Motorola instance.6 
Civil Rights Act proponents went even further in downplaying the idea that 
the bill would  limit employee testing. In a lengthy memo that Chase and 
Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania prepared in defense of the bill, the 
senators argued that:
There is no requirement in Title VII that employers abandon bona 
fide qualification tests where, because of differences in background and 
educations, members of some groups are able to perform better on these 
tests than members of other groups.  An employer may set his qualification 
as high as he likes, he may test to determine which applicants have these 
qualifications, and he may hire, assign, and promote on the basis of test 
performance. 
To make the point clearer, the senators eventually added section 703(h) to the 
legislation, which  directly addressed employment tests. The relevant language 
reads in part that a “professionally developed ability test” will not be unlawful, 
The civil rights community was con-
cerned that some employee testing 
was being done to intentionally 
exclude minority job candidates. 
The business community defended 
employer testing and claimed that 
it was fundamental to ensuring a 
qualified workforce.
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provided that: 
such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, 
intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin.”7 
A fair reading of this text, coupled with the legislative history, would indicate 
that employment tests are perfectly legal as long as the tests are not being 
“designed, intended or used” to discriminate against minorities. It seemed 
that Congress had properly addressed the issue by eliminating tests that were 
“designed, intended or used” to discriminate,  but not completely forbidding 
testing altogether.
While it seemed that a reasonable compromise had been struck, some hard-line 
opponents of the bill were skeptical.  For example, Senator Tower said at the time,
I feel that the regulations, lawsuits, and federal pressures placed upon 
private business by this title are utterly unacceptable in a free economy, 
particularly since these pressures can be placed upon any firm at any time in 
presuming the firm guilty until it proves itself innocent.8 
His words would turn out to be an accurate prediction of the future.  
Griggs v. Duke Power (1971)
riggs v. Duke Power was the first major case that questioned the 
applicability and reach of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in 
employment testing.  
Before Title VII was enacted in 1964, Duke Power had discriminated against 
black employees either through not hiring them or keeping them in low-paying 
jobs. In 1955 the company instituted a policy that required a high school 
diploma in order to be placed or promoted to higher paying jobs. This policy 
did not directly affect black workers because they were not given promotion 
opportunities in any case—explicitly on racial grounds.9   
On the date that Title VII became effective—July 2, 1965—Duke Power 
changed its policy and made the high school equivalence requirement binding 
on all workers, black and white. This allowed black workers promotion 
opportunities they had not had. The new promotion rules also provided that 
workers could meet the high school requirement by achieving minimum scores 
on two widely used aptitude tests: the Wonderlic Personnel Test and the 
Bennett Mechanical Composition Test. The minimum scores required for these 
G
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tests basically corresponded to the scores of the average high school graduate at 
the time.10   
The Wonderlic Personnel Test is a twelve-minute, fifty-question intelligence test  
that assesses a person’s aptitude and ability to problem-solve in a wide range of 
activities. The test is best known today for its use in evaluating the intelligence 
of professional football players. Almost every professional football team uses a 
player’s Wonderlic score when evaluating that individual’s talent potential.11  
The Bennett Mechanical Composition Test focuses more narrowly on mechanical 
concepts and the application of physical laws. The test-makers claim that the  
test is “especially well-suited for assessing job candidates for positions that require 
a grasp of the principles underlying the operation and repair of complex 
devices.”12    
In order to help ease the transition to equal opportunity, Duke also instituted a  
program, open to all races, by which the company would pay for two-thirds of  
the cost of education for employees who did not have the required 
credentials for promotion.13  In essence, the company had ended its policy of 
discrimination. It tried to institute objective requirements for promotion and 
agreed to assist employees financially in obtaining scores that would meet these 
new requirements.
The plaintiffs in the Griggs case argued that the diploma and testing 
requirements discriminated against African-Americans and thus violated Title 
VII. They further claimed that section 703(h)  in the Civil Rights Act of  
1964, quoted in part above, required 
that a test measure only the actual 
ability to do a specific job. The law, 
they contended, would forbid more 
general and abstract intelligence tests 
such as the ones employed by Duke 
Power. 
Initially, the district court dismissed 
the action, finding that a test 
was acceptable under Title VII as 
long as there was no intentional discrimination on the part of the employer. 
Despite the past history of discrimination at Duke Power, it was agreed that the 
company was no longer discriminating intentionally.  
Then, however, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part. That 
court held that the added requirements for promotion (the aptitude tests) were 
in violation of Title VII because African-Americans had been confined to 
lower-paying departments before 1965. But the court qualified its ruling, saying 
The plaintiffs in the Griggs case 
argued that the diploma and 
testing requirements discriminated 
against African-Americans and 
thus violated Title VII. 
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that if the tests were not employed to continue past discrimination, there would 
not be a Title VII issue.14   
In essence, the appeals court was trying to distinguish between two classes of 
black workers—those hired before 1965 and those hired after. For the first set, 
the court said that the testing requirement was discriminatory because some 
white workers had advanced without taking the test.  But for the second class of 
workers, those hired after 1965, the testing requirements had been imposed for 
all employees. The appeals court held that these employees were not victims of 
unlawful discrimination.15   
On the issue of the tests themselves, the circuit court noted the actual language 
of the statute as well as the legislative history of the act. It held that tests 
do not need to be job-related, and it specifically rejected Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission guidelines that, in the court’s words, were “contrary 
to compelling legislative history.”16 
Despite these court rulings and the legislative history, the Supreme Court 
reversed. In a unanimous decision, the Court took a much broader view of 
section 703(h), saying that Congress had required:
the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment 
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial 
or other impermissible classification . . . . The Act proscribes not only overt 
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory 
in operation.  The touchstone is business necessity.  If an employment 
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited.”17 (italics added)
In laying out this rationale, the Court 
then established a multi-pronged 
threshold for employment tests. If 
the test itself is shown to have a 
“disparate impact”—meaning that 
different groups perform differently 
on it even without intentional 
discrimination by the employer—
then the test itself must have a direct 
“business necessity” in order for an 
employer to administer it. In applying this broad principle to the case before it, 
the Court found:
On the record before us, neither the high school completion requirement 
nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable 
relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used.18 
The Court established a multi-
pronged threshold. If the test is 
shown to have a “disparate  
impact” then it must have a direct 
“business necessity” to be allowed. 
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In arguing that the tests themselves were permitted under 703(h), Duke cited 
specific language of the act, which permitted “professionally developed ability 
tests” that are not “designed, intended, or used to discriminate because of race.” 
The Court, however, dismissed that reading of the statute and instead deferred 
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The Court noted 
that at the time of the case the Commission
has issued guidelines interpreting 703 (h) to permit only the use of job-
related tests. The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing 
agency is entitled to great deference.19   
Thus, the effects of Griggs v. Duke Power were multi-fold. First, the Court held 
that there need not be a specific intent to discriminate in order to prove a case 
under Title VII and 703(h). Furthermore, the results of the test itself were 
enough to prove discrimination. Essentially, discrimination could be proved 
simply by showing that one racial group performed worse than another.  
Most important, once the discriminatory impact has been established, the burden 
falls upon the employer to demonstrate that the test is “job-related” or a 
“business necessity” in order for the test to be valid. General intelligence and  
mechanical tests would have a difficult time meeting these demanding standards.
At the time of the decision, there was criticism of this “business necessity” 
burden. In an analysis of Griggs, a note published in the Columbia Law Review 
stated that, “Perhaps the most important holding of Griggs is that once a 
discriminatory effect is shown, the burden of establishing that the test is 
job-related passes to the defendant. The Court, however, neither cited any 
legislative history nor proposed any legal theory for this interpretation.”20  The 
writer also noted that it was possible that the Court was simply endorsing a 
“social policy favoring plaintiffs in fair employment cases.”21 
Deference to EEOC Guidelines
ne of the most important parts of the Griggs ruling was the deference 
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines, 
especially in regard to the definition of “business necessity” and the 
validation of employment tests.  
Because employment tests are often judged in the context of  “disparate impact,” 
it is important to recognize what EEOC guidelines consider disparate impact. 
The EEOC has endorsed what is known as the 80-percent rule, which states:
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-
O
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fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest 
rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as 
evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will 
generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of 
adverse impact.22 
Practically speaking, the rule works in the following way. Suppose that a factory 
imposes an employment test on which 60 percent of white applicants receive a 
passing score, but only 40 percent of African-American workers do. The ratio of 
African-American success to white success would be 40/60, or about 66 percent, 
which would not meet the 80-percent rule. The test would be said to have a 
“disparate impact.”  
If this threshold level of  “disparate impact” has been met, the Court said, it 
would allow such tests if they met the standard of  “business necessity.” The 
Court relied on EEOC guidelines in defining the key terms “business necessity.”  
As legal scholar Richard Epstein notes, 
The words business necessity were not casually chosen, for they have real bite 
in practice. They have been strictly construed in the EEOC guidelines on the  
subject, which have received general acceptance in the courts. Although 
there is some variation in the level of rigor found in various cases, one 
common formulation of the concept provides that the practice must be 
essential, the purpose compelling. On this view it is not enough that a test 
is perfectly reasonable and plausible in the sense of cost effective: virtually 
any test in common use meets this standard.  More must be shown….”23
To be allowed, tests must be validated by the same EEOC guidelines, which 
only allow three methods of test validation. These are:  content studies, construct 
studies, and criterion validity studies. They will be briefly summarized here.
Content studies aim to measure direct abilities of employees in relationship 
to the job at hand.  Can a welder actually weld? Can a UPS driver lift heavy 
packages?  The advantage to these studies is that they are straightforward and 
relatively non-controversial. But they are limited in that they cannot test 
beyond the extremely narrow range of skills specified for the job. Sometimes the 
physical job itself is only one component of what the overall job will entail.24 
Construct studies are similar to content studies but far more complex. Employers 
try to establish a connection between traits desired in an employee and their 
connection to the job at hand. But the EEOC warns that developing a valid 
construct test is next to impossible. Its guidelines state that validating such 
studies “is a relatively new and developing procedure in the employment field, 
and there is at present a lack of substantial literature extending the concept to 
employment practices.”25 
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The third form of test validation is the criterion validity study. These studies 
“seek to relate the use of the selection device with success on the job.”26  The 
EEOC guidelines are cumbersome here too, spanning six pages of difficult-
to-understand concepts, all of which, in Epstein’s words, “ostensibly protect 
against every possible form of bias, overt or hidden.”27  The EEOC is particularly 
concerned with any written test, specifically warning that “[c]riterion measures 
consisting of paper and pencil tests will be closely reviewed for job relevance.”28  
In the end, the EEOC’s interpretation of disparate impact and business necessity 
imposes significant burdens on employers wishing to perform testing. Epstein 
concludes that part of this can be traced to the agency’s zealous mission in not 
only enacting the law that was passed, but also trying to go above and beyond 
and eliminate any and all discrimination in the workplace.29  
  
The Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972
n its face, there is a plausible case to be made that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Griggs misinterpreted the original intent of the Civil Rights 
Act. But rather than clarify the situation, Congress subsequently adopted 
legislation that endorsed Griggs. This took the form of the 1972 Equal 
Opportunity Employment Act.
This act expanded the original 
legislation to include firms with 
more than eight employees, down 
from twenty-five in the Civil Rights 
Act. It also extended coverage to 
employees of federal, state, and local 
governments as well as workers at 
educational institutions, and it increased the enforcement capabilities of the 
EEOC. Griggs was now legislatively enshrined.   
In retrospect, the 1964 Civil Rights Act can be seen as well-thought out, 
thoroughly debated, and construed in a way that avoided excesses. But as Epstein 
points out, the 1972 Equal Opportunity Employment Act was void of these 
characteristics.  
…the legislative history of the 1972 act reflects a consensus moral certitude 
about social rights and wrongs that stands in stark contrast to the closely 
fought, tightly reasoned struggle over the 1964 act. In a sense it offers 
powerful evidence that Griggs anticipated the mood of the 1972 Congress. 
There are explicit approving references to Griggs, and the Senate report 
even discusses the change in orientation from the 1964 debates.30 
Rather than clarify the situation, 
Congress adopted legislation that 
endorsed Griggs and increased the 
EEOC’s enforcement capabilities.
O
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Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio
fter Griggs, a number of decisions addressed the issues that it raised. 
They include the 1975 case Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, Dothard 
v. Rawlinson (1977), Connecticut v. Teal (1982), and Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust (1988). The general effect of those decisions was 
to confirm restraints on the use of job application tests.  
In 1989, however, the tide began to 
turn. Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio 
would have more far-reaching 
consequences, although its effects 
were short-lived. Indeed, by moving 
in a different direction, the case may 
have motivated members of Congress 
to intervene.
Wards Cove Packing31 operated 
salmon cannery plants in Alaska. The jobs at the plants were divided between 
“cannery jobs,” which usually involved unskilled labor, and “noncannery 
jobs,” which were classified as skilled labor positions. The cannery jobs were 
predominantly filled by nonwhites, including Filipinos and native Alaskans. 
The noncannery positions were held primarily by white workers, and they paid 
more than the cannery ones.32  
The respondents, who were challenging this situation using disparate impact 
analysis under Title VII, claimed that the “hiring and promotion practices were 
responsible for the racial stratification.”  
On the disparate impact question, the Court said that simply comparing the 
number of jobs held by whites versus nonwhites in the selected categories—as 
the plaintiffs had done—was “nonsensical.” The better comparison was between 
the “racial composition of the at-issue jobs and the racial composition of the 
qualified population in the relevant labor market.” 
But the Court did not stop there. It radically redefined the business necessity 
standard as well.  Since Griggs, the employer had held the complete burden of 
proving that a test that had a disparate impact on employees was a “business 
necessity” or “job related.”  This strict interpretation of the standard deterred 
employers from testing prospective employees for fear of encountering 
litigation. The decision in Watson at least hinted that the Court in the late 
1980s—decidedly more conservative than its predecessor in the mid- and late 
1970s—might have a less stringent view of this standard.  Wards Cove Packing 
confirmed this suspicion.
In 1989, however, the tide began 
to turn. Wards Cove Packing 
v. Atonio would have more far-
reaching consequences, although 
its effects were short-lived.
A
0        Griggs v. Duke Power: Implications for College Credentialing Bryan O’Keefe and Richard Vedder        
The Court ruled that the plaintiffs in such cases carried the burden of 
persuasion, “for it is he who must prove that it was because of such individual’s 
race, color etc. that he was denied a desired employment opportunity.”
The Court noted the difficult position employers faced:
The burden of persuasion, however, remains with the disparate-impact 
plaintiff . . . . There is no requirement that the challenged practice be 
“essential” or “indispensable” to the employer’s business for it to pass muster: 
this degree of scrutiny would be almost impossible for most employers to 
meet and would result in a host of evils.33 
Knowing that this “persuasion” point was a radical departure from the Griggs 
standard, the Court also addressed prior rulings saying that:
The plaintiff bears the burden of disproving an employer’s assertion that 
the adverse employment action or practice was based solely on a legitimate 
neutral consideration.  We acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions can 
be read as suggesting otherwise. But to the extent that those cases speak of an 
employer’s “burden of proof” with respect to a legitimate business justification 
defense, they should have been understood to mean an employer’s production—
but not persuasion—burden.34 (italics added)
The Court gave plaintiffs an opportunity to still challenge employment practices 
even if they passed the new thresholds, but it left the burden of proof with 
the plaintiffs themselves. The Court said that if an employer does prevail on 
the “legitimate employment goal” threshold, the plaintiffs could still have a 
plausible case if they proved that there were available “alternative practices to 
achieve the same business ends, with less racial impact.”35   
The Court’s decision in this matter was groundbreaking, essentially tossing out 
the Griggs “business necessity” standard and restricting the disparate impact 
analysis commonly used. It appeared to allow employers once again to institute 
their own employment practices, including tests, without fear of expensive and 
lengthy disparate impact litigation.
1991 Civil Rights Act
he celebration from employers was temporary. Democrats in Congress, 
encouraged by liberal activists, were upset over Wards Cove and the 
apparent death of the more stringent “business necessity” clause. 
In February 1990, less than one year after the Wards Cove decision, 
Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) introduced S. 2104, which would “amend the 
T
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 to restore and strengthen civil rights laws that ban 
discrimination in employment, and for other purposes.”36 
Kennedy’s legislation initially sought to overturn Wards Cove entirely, codify 
Griggs, and also offer a stringent definition of business necessity. Republicans 
lined up against the bill, fearing 
that it would mandate employer 
racial quotas. Over the next two 
years, hundreds of hours were spent 
debating the legislation, adding 
amendments, threatening vetoes, and 
trying to reach a compromise among 
Kennedy, Senate Republicans, and 
President George H. W. Bush.
In the end, with a presidential 
election looming and not wanting to 
appear to be insensitive to minorities, 
President Bush signed a compromise 
bill. The compromise restored the 
business necessity standard articulated by Griggs and returned the burden of proof 
to the employer. The final bill said that an unlawful employment practice is 
established when a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of discrimination “and the 
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for 
the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”37   
The actual words “business necessity” were not specifically defined in the 
bill, a clarification that Kennedy and others had sought. Nevertheless, 
the act referenced the Griggs decision and the seventeen years of judicial 
precedents before Wards Cove. It was an implicit endorsement of the same 
standard that Griggs used, and it repudiated the important distinction that 
Wards Cove had made.    
Testing Today
he Griggs decision and related cases and statutes made standardized 
testing in the workplace a complex legal matter, but employment 
testing did not disappear. As mentioned earlier, teams in the National  
Football League administer the Wonderlic test every year to prospective 
players before the NFL draft, giving them a sense of a player’s mental aptitude 
before handing out multi-million dollar contracts for their services.38  In fact, 
according to Staffing Industry Report, a human resources newsletter, 65 percent of  
companies reported using some type of pre-employment screen, up from 34 
percent in prior years.39   
In the end, with a presidential 
election looming and not wanting 
to appear to be insensitive to 
minorities, President Bush signed  
a compromise bill. The compromise  
restored the business necessity 
standard articulated by Griggs and  
returned the burden of proof to 
the employer. 
T
        Griggs v. Duke Power: Implications for College Credentialing Bryan O’Keefe and Richard Vedder        
Testing today, however, is radically different from what was commonplace 
during the original Griggs decision. The employment testing industry itself even 
eschews the word “testing,” preferring the new term “instruments.”40 Despite the  
linguistics, the tests or instruments still try to fulfill the same basic goal: providing  
employers with useful information that helps discern whether an employee is 
qualified for a job and a good fit.
Employers today have responded and adapted to the Griggs decision by focusing 
most of their tests on narrow subjects that are directly and unambiguously 
related to the job in question or conducting personality tests that, while more 
general in nature, still have a straightforward connection to the traits needed for  
the employment opportunity.  
 
Narrow employee tests are common in the information technology (IT) 
field, a specialized field that hardly existed at the time of Griggs. For example, 
Brainbench, a Virginia testing firm, now offers over 600 different employee 
assessment tests, a majority of them dedicated to information technology, 
computer, or technical skills.41  These tests are highly specific in nature, usually 
focusing on a single topic or computer program.
There have been few legal challenges under the Griggs standards for these 
assessments. The tests are narrowly construed, directly related to the actual 
task the employee will be expected to perform, and developed without any 
hint of prejudice or racial favor. If, for example, an employee cannot pass a pre-
screening test on how to use Microsoft Excel, and using Excel properly is the 
most important part of that employee’s job function, then it is clear that the test 
itself is performing a useful function both for the employee and the employer. 
The employer finds the job candidates best able to perform the necessary work 
while the applicant can be sure 
that he or she can satisfy the work 
requirements. In many ways, the 
Griggs decision and subsequent cases 
and legislation did not anticipate 
the type of employee testing that is 
routinely used in the IT industry.  
Personality tests are common, too. 
These tests are more general in 
nature and do not, for the most part, 
enter into the controversial realms of aptitude and competence.  Tests in this 
category—such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, the Predictive Index, and the  
Leadership Challenge Profile—have become a popular and easy way for employers 
to make judgments about whether a candidate is truly suited for a particular job. 
The Myers-Briggs Indicator is widely implemented, with the New York Times 
claiming that 89 out of the Fortune 100 companies use it in some fashion.42    
Employers focus most of their tests 
on narrow subjects directly and 
unambiguously related to the job 
in question or conduct personality 
tests closely connected to the 
needed traits.
        Griggs v. Duke Power: Implications for College Credentialing Bryan O’Keefe and Richard Vedder        
According to professionals in the testing industry, the modern-day employment 
tests focus on specific functions and traits. Many test publishers are  “creating 
items that appear directly relevant to the work setting—writing personality 
items that are framed within the work context,” says Judy Chartrand, director 
of talent assessment at Pearsons Education, the parent company of Harcourt 
Assessment, the nation’s most well-known testing company.43  Chartrand 
stresses, however, that even for all of the differences, the basic tenets of testing 
remain the same. “The tests still measure the same underlying concepts.”44 
Even the most controversial tests of the Griggs era can be narrowly used. In the 
Griggs case itself, the use of the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test was 
a central issue, with the majority finding that the way Duke Power used the 
test was not “directed or intended to measure the ability to learn to perform a 
particular job or category of jobs.”45  Harcourt, which continues to administer 
the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test today, says that the test is 
reasonable to use under the right circumstances. “For example,” says Chartrand, 
“in a position such as tool maker, mechanical composition is typically a 
requisite for effective performance. Employers need to use assessments that are 
directly mapped to job competencies.”46 
Even if that need is beyond dispute, employment law experts still believe that murky 
legal waters surround employment testing. In May 2007, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission held a public meeting on current employment 
testing issues. The Commission heard from attorneys representing plaintiffs and 
companies, as well as two widely recognized organizational psychologists.47  
Kenneth M. Willner, an employment attorney at Paul, Hastings, Janofsky, and 
Walker, laid out the problems that continue to plague government and legal 
policy toward testing. He began his testimony by suggesting that misuse by 
employers is relatively rare.  In his experience, “the vast majority of employers 
use testing for legitimate nondiscriminatory business reasons.”48   
In fact, Willner claims that the desire to use tests in the first place is not to 
discriminate but rather to remove subjective—and possibly unfair—judgments from 
the hiring process. Employers are aware that “unfettered subjective decision- 
making can lead to allegations of a pattern or practice of employment discrimination, 
so they search for objective measures.”49  Even if Duke Power used testing 
unfairly forty years ago, societal norms have shifted so much in the intervening 
time period that hardly any company uses testing for that same purpose today.
Yet the courts and federal agencies such as the EEOC still pursue discriminatory 
claims against them, often unevenly and using vague guidelines, said Willner. As a  
result, employers’ efforts “to eradicate subjective practices by adopting uniform and 
objective selection criteria may lead them, ironically, into a potential liability trap.”50 
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Willner argues for two reforms. First, he proposes that the Uniform Guidelines 
on Employee Selection Procedure, which have been used by the EEOC 
in prosecuting employment 
discrimination claims, be revised. 
The guidelines have not been 
adapted or changed since 1978, 
despite numerous revisions of 
other testing standards from major 
psychological associations such as the 
American Psychological Association’s 
Standards for Educational and 
Psychological Tests, and the 
Principles for the Validation and Use 
of Employee Selection Procedures. 
While Griggs was ultimately codified, the 1978 Uniform Guidelines still do not 
take into consideration the important legal questions that many justices raised 
in the 1980s cases following Griggs.51  
Willner also recommends “better training of agency investigators and other 
personnel.”52  The EEOC should use its resources to pursue employers who are 
actually breaking the letter and spirit of the law, not to harass companies that 
are using legitimate tests, even when the tests might not yield results that the 
EEOC desires from a diversity perspective.  
“Often,” says Willner, “it seems that initial characterization of tests as measuring 
‘cognitive ability’ or ‘math skills’ leads to assumptions about adverse impact that 
drive the result, rather than evaluation of actual adverse impact data or validity 
evidence. It appears that this could be addressed by additional or focused 
training.”53 
While employers as a whole feel confident using strictly designed tests, it’s also 
equally clear that legal liability exists, even for companies with the best of 
intentions. 
The Impact on Postsecondary Education
s this legislative and legal history makes clear, since the early 1970s 
employers have faced significant legal hurdles in administering 
employment tests. The Griggs ruling established the standard that 
tests could not have a disparate impact and be legally permissible 
unless they were directly related to the task the employee was being asked to 
perform, and the burden of showing this fell on the employer. 
“The EEOC should use its 
resources to pursue employers who 
are actually breaking the letter 
and spirit of the law, not to harass 
companies that are using legitimate 
tests,” says Kenneth M. Willner.
A
        Griggs v. Duke Power: Implications for College Credentialing Bryan O’Keefe and Richard Vedder        
The import of this history is that employers are deterred by the threat of 
litigation from using general intelligence tests and aptitude tests to measure job 
candidates.54  Yet for jobs that have complex components that will change as 
conditions change, general intelligence may be more important than specific 
job skills. 
Colleges and universities have stepped in to fill the informational void. A college  
degree often indicates a certain amount of aptitude and determination. It 
reveals that a student has met a certain set of standards on a consistent basis 
over a period of time and thus probably has some valuable aptitudes and skills. 
It is our contention that many employers have made the college degree a de 
facto intelligence test and focus on hiring only those applicants who possess it. 
Of course, many factors contribute to the increase in college attendance in the 
United States, which went from 5.8 million in 1970 to 17.5 million in 2005.55  
But it is also likely that some of the demand for workers with college credentials 
can be explained by employers’ need for a substitute for general intelligence tests.  
Applicants for many jobs are now required to have a college degree. Seldom is 
that done because the work is so demanding that it couldn’t be done by a person 
who didn’t go to college, but instead it is a means of screening out presumably 
less trainable applicants. For naturally talented candidates, the college degree 
may not add much value in terms of job capability. Many students who attend 
college benefit enormously from the academics, discipline, social atmosphere, 
and maturity that higher education can foster in their lives, but a substantial 
portion of students are already talented, motivated, driven, and mature before 
they ever enter a college classroom. For students who desire occupational 
tracking rather than a liberal education, college may add very little in terms 
of long-term value. Because of Griggs and its progeny, however, employers 
have great difficulty identifying these candidates and therefore require college 
credentials as an initial screening mechanism. 
If businesses were allowed to use intelligence testing to screen applicants, that 
might save all parties involved a tremendous amount of time, money, and 
other resources. Instead, students must go through college, and employers must 
wait until the candidate has the college degree to find them. Even then, the 
most suitable and qualified candidates can still get lost in the shuffle, as they 
are competing against hundreds of thousands of other students who also have 
college degrees.
The widespread availability of college education has changed the landscape 
of employment opportunity. One consequence is that it has arguably made 
employment more difficult for minorities. Qualified minorities who performed 
well on an intelligence or aptitude test and would have been offered a job 
directly thirty or forty years ago are now compelled to attend a college or 
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university for four years and incur significant costs. For some young people from 
poorer families, those costs are out of reach. 
The unintended economic consequences of Griggs on college attendance and 
labor markets are worthy of further exploration.
The Possible Economic Impact
ne of the striking changes in higher education in the past few decades 
is the increase in the wage differential between those who attend high 
schools and those who attend college, as indicated in Figures 1 and 2 
on the next page. These figures contain data from the U.S. Bureau of 
the Census on earnings differentials between high school and college graduates 
for the years 1958 to 2005.56  (There was some change in the way the data were 
classified in 1991, so some caution should be used in interpreting the results 
after that.)
For both males and females, the 
earnings differential was relatively 
stable in the two decades prior to 
1978, but the differentials rose 
sharply after that date. To be sure, 
there are nuanced differences in the 
two graphs, but the “bottom line” for 
both is that the earnings differentials 
between high school and college 
graduates rose significantly from 1978 to 2005, whereas the differential had not 
risen importantly in the two decades before 1978.57 
We have marked 1978 as a dividing point, on the assumption that the impact 
of Griggs started to be really felt around seven years after the decision. There 
likely is a lag of several years between the time a court decision is made and the 
time it significantly affects labor markets. And if the Griggs decision affected 
the demand for college, we should expect an additional lag of four or five years, 
the time between deciding to go to college and actually obtaining a degree and 
entering the labor market. 
The reason that some of this increase in the wage differential may be due to 
Griggs is that Griggs has made it virtually impossible for students without a college 
degree to get in the door for an interview for a well-paying job. We are suggesting 
that employers’ shift to demanding a college degree not only encouraged more 
students to get degrees but also reduced the return to a mere high school degree. 
O
We have marked 1978 as a 
dividing point, on the assumption 
that the impact of Griggs started 
to be really felt around seven 
years after the decision.
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This likelihood of a major impact by Griggs invites detailed research. Statistical 
techniques (e.g., some form of multivariate analysis) could be used to try to 
separate the Griggs portion of the rising earnings differential from that caused by 
other factors, for example the rise in globalization and its impact in suppressing 
wages of unskilled workers, who are mostly persons without a college education.
Figure 1
 
Figure 2
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Let us take a minute to speculate on the potential impact of Griggs. Assume that 
Griggs and its legal and legislative aftermath explain the 20 percentage-point 
widening in the high school/college earnings differential. That translates into 
a roughly $7,000 annual earnings increment associated with college training 
(more for males, less for females). If one considers that there are over 25 
million workers with four-year college degrees, that implies that at least $175 
billion annually in income has shifted from high school to college graduates 
on account of Griggs and its aftermath. The present value of all such income 
redistribution in the past three decades is measured in literally trillions of dollars. 
If these estimations—admittedly, speculation at this point—are accurate, Griggs 
may have very important economic implications. For an individual worker, 
the present value at the time of college graduation of the future stream of 
earnings associated with the Griggs-related portion of the educational earnings 
differential could be $200,000 or more. Correspondingly, there may be earnings 
losses for people who do not obtain college degrees and are therefore compelled 
to compete for jobs where no degree is required.
The enormous increase in demand for a college degree has had other effects. One  
is to contribute to an environment of aggressive tuition increases. The Bureau 
of Labor Statistics data price index based on college tuition fees is available only 
for the post-Griggs era, but the sizable real increase in tuition costs in that era is 
consistent with the view that Griggs has been tuition-enhancing.
The magnitude of the possible effect here suggests that further research is needed. 
In addition to removing the impact of other factors to determine the Griggs 
impact on college attendance, good measures of tuition increases before and 
after Griggs should be developed. This would permit analysis of the impact of 
that court decision and the later judicial and legislative actions on college costs.
 
Returning to the legal issues, there is another question that Griggs spawned but 
that has not yet been considered by our legal system. At the time of Griggs, a high 
school diploma was one of the requirements for employment in the Duke power  
plant. Today, a college degree performs much the same role. Any cursory glance 
at help wanted ads in the newspaper reveals that many employers will not 
consider applicants who do not have college degrees for many positions. It is not  
clear that having a college degree requirement is legal under the Griggs standard. 
Recall that the problem in Griggs was that the specified requirements for job 
applicants were not clearly and directly related to the actual demands of the work. 
If challenged, could employers who have set the college degree as a requirement 
show that it has anything at all to do with the “business necessity” of the 
employer or are “job-related”? That is very doubtful. Employers have grown to rely 
upon a new credential that is imperfect and probably rules out many qualified 
candidates. If the EEOC and the courts were to scrutinize the college degree 
requirement, they might well conclude that it has a “disparate impact.”
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Conclusion
Over the years, the explosion in college enrollment and higher education costs 
has been attributed to many factors.  But largely overlooked have been the 1964 
Civil Rights Act and the Griggs case and its related rulings. Yet these may have 
made major contributions to these developments. If so, the law of unintended 
consequences will have been proven correct once again. 
This increase in college tuition has disproportionately harmed minorities and 
the poor, as many members of these socio-economic groups are unable to afford 
college today, even with financial aid. Thus, in spite of the outspoken goals of 
improving minority employment that presumably motivated the long series of 
cases and political lobbying described in this paper, it is possible that the Griggs 
decision has made it harder for some minority candidates to secure jobs. 
The long-term policy and legal challenge might be to remove higher education 
from this vocational credentialing role, allowing employers to test job 
candidates so long as the tests are fair and do not intentionally discriminate, 
and return the Ivory Tower to its core missions, which have been lost in the 
incessant zeal for college degrees over the last thirty-five years.  
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